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I
Nietzsche says: “God is a sacred lie (eine beilige Luge)”' Nietzsche was 
not merely saying that “God is a lie” as many atheists and anti-religionists 
do. Rather, he affirms that God is “the sacred.” In that limitation, there is 
a point in which Nietzsche is in agreement with the view of religionists who 
believe in God. However, Nietzsche does not stop with that. He seems to say: 
“God is sacred. However, God is a lie precisely in being sacred.” It seems to me 
that the above quotation should be understood in this fashion.
In what sense has Nietzsche affirmed God to be “the sacred”? At the begin­
ning of The Will to Power, concerning the advantage which the Christian moral 
hypothesis brought, he speaks of the following purport. Christian morality 
granted an absolute value to man who is small and accidental within the flux 
of becoming and passing away; it conceded the character of freedom and 
perfection to the world filled with suffering and evil, and posited that man has 
the possibility of knowing this absolute value and perfection. In this way, 
it prevented man from rebelling against life and despairing of cognition. “In 
sum: [Christian] morality was the great antidote against practical and theore­
tical nihilism” (Tier Wille zur Macht, Kroner edition, section 4). It may be 
thought that Nietzsche has recognized God, “the sacred,” as that fundamen-
* This paper was originally published in Japanese in Ki/J, No. 442, April 1970. The 
author is deeply grateful to Professor David Dilworth, who translated the paper, and 
to Professor Morris Augustine, who read it and gave valuable suggestions.
1 In Nietzsche’s writings there is no literal formulation for this sentence. But it seems 
justifiable to interpolate it from his writings, particularly Dtr Antichriit, sections 18, 36, 
55 and Der Wilk zjtr Macht, section 141, etc.
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tai source of value which confers transcendent, absolute value, in the midst 
of man's valuelessness and the world’s meaninglessness, and as the foundation 
ground which saves man from his own self-negation and destruction. But now 
this God is dead. For such a “God” was a “lie” which man, who could not 
bear the nibilum of the valuelessness of himself and the meaninglessness of the 
world, has fabricated in the depths of his awareness of that mhilum. “Man 
does not speak of nibilum: man speaks instead of the ‘other-shore’; or ‘God’; or 
the ‘true life’; or nirvana, deliverance, pure bliss.” And Nietzsche regards 
this as “a tendency which is antagonistic to life” (Drr Antichrist, section 7).
The paradoxical words of Nietzsche who says “God is a sacred lie” were 
deeply rooted in an awareness of what he himself calls a “fundamental fal­
sity.” This fact also indicates that Nietzsche’s position was based on an acute 
historical insight, on the one hand, and that he was attempting to recover life 
and nature from its deepest source, on the other.
The artificial construction of a “God” in the depths of the awareness of 
nibilum is not some arbitrary and casual matter which man could refrain from 
doing. Nietzsche rather sees it as an inevitable enterprise rising out of the 
instinct for self-preservation deeply rooted in man’s life. Further, he recognizes 
that it is a disguised and inverted function—indispensable for man’s life 
itself—of a cosmological “will to power” which transcends man. But even 
though it is a fundamental enterprise for human life, it itself is an artificial 
construct, a self-deception.
To speak in historical terms, the empty construct of “God” was thus 
fundamental to human life, and therefore, down to the present day, it has 
functioned efficaciously as “the sacred” in the life of man, and especially in the 
lives of the weak and downtrodden. By believing in the existence of a “true 
world” behind this world, men could endure the nibilum of this world. But 
when Nietzsche proclaims that “now God is dead,” he personally discerned, 
prior to all others, that this era has come to an end, and that no matter how 
fundamental it is, the era which ought to be aware of this deception as a 
deception, has arrived. This is the reason he preaches the arrival of nihilism.
On the other hand, Nietzsche bitterly censures the instinct of theologians, 
which fabricates the kingdom of God on the other-shore of nibilum, claiming 
that such an instinct brings about a spoliation of life and an attitude of anti­
naturalness. “The instinct of theologians is the most widely spread and truly 
15
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
subterranean form of falsity on the earth. .. . Wherever the influence of the 
theologians extends, value-judgments are overturned, and the concepts of‘true’ 
and ‘false’ are necessarily inverted; what is most prejudicial to life is here 
called ‘true/ while what most elevates, extols, affirms, justifies and makes 
life triumphant is called ‘false’ ” Qbid., section 9). According to Nietzsche, 
the essence of life is the instinct for the development and preservation of life, 
the instinct toward the accumulation of energy, the instinct to power. How­
ever, antagonism against life, nature, and the will to live has been proclaimed 
in the name of God. “Since the concept of‘nature’ has been fabricated as the 
anti-concept to ‘God,’ the ‘natural’ could not help becoming the word for 
‘worthy of being rejected’—and the total world of that fiction has its root 
in hatred of the natural (— of actuality!)” (ibid., section 15). It was Nietz­
sche’s intention to cause the value-judgments of “true” and “false” which 
had been inverted in the name of God to be again reversed, and thus to re­
cover life and naturalness which had been robbed in the name of God.
To sweep away every empty construct and return to the will to power itself— 
that is a return to life itself; it is a returning to the innocence of becoming 
fUnscbuld des Werdensj). That was, for Nietzsche, the attainment of reality, 
and at the same time the full realization of sincerity. Nietzsche’s ideas of the 
“Over-man” fUbermenscb} who can endure the nibilum without God, the will 
to the eternal return which says “If that be life, so let it be, once again!” and 
the Dionysian philosophy which is a “religious affirmation of life,” all are 
grounded herein. Every attempt at a revaluation of all values which tries to 
expose the hidden source of the concept of “God” and to restore life and 
naturalness from their deepest root which had been robbed by God fails to 
succeed if it lacks the awareness of deception expressed in the phrase “God 
is a sacred lie.”
Precisely the awareness of deception expressed in “God is a sacred lie,” the 
awareness of what Nietzsche himself calls “fundamental falsity,” is the deci­
sive moment for the establishment of Nietzsche’s nihilism and constitutes its 
core. In that sense Nietzsche’s nihilism may be called a nihilism based on an 
awareness of falsity. As has been already made clear, falsity spoken of here is 
a fundamental self-deception—called “God” and “faith”—functioning in the 
depths of the fundamental nibilum of present existence; it is the self-deception 
perpetrated by the very disguised and inverted will itself to power.
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n
In Zen, too, it is said that “the triple world2 is a deception.” This is of 
course an insight shared by all Buddhists and it constitutes the background of 
Zen. For example, in the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, it is written that 
“the triple world is a deception and merely the creation of the mind. Apart 
from the mind, the realm of the six grains of dust ceases to be.” What is here 
called “mind” means conceptual mind in modem terms. The conceptual mind 
is the discriminating mind which distinguishes between subject and object, 
between being and non-being, between right and wrong, good and evil, and 
so forth. We set up the world of objectivity over against the subjectivity of the 
self, and taking it as the objective world, make various distinctions concerning 
it; but these are all false and unreal worlds produced by the discriminating 
mind, and not the world of true reality. Once one departs from that kind of 
discriminating mind, the discriminated world also ceases to be and the real 
world manifests itself in its “suchness.” The AwaJuning of Faith, continuing 
the above quotation, adds: “...since all things are without exception devel­
oped from the mind, and produced under the condition of delusions.” Indeed, 
it goes on to says “Every discrimination discriminates the mind of the self; 
[but] since the mind does not see the mind itself, there is no form to be ob­
tained.” In these citations we have the true meaning of “the triple world is 
a deception,” and at the same time find a clue to the standpoint of Zen.
2 The triple world is the Buddhist conception of the world of transmigration which 
consists of the three realms of sensuous desire, form, and formless pure spirit.
The discriminating mind, which distinguishes the objective world in 
various ways and which thereby produces a discriminated world, distinguishes 
its own mind as well. This is an unavoidable activity from the original nature 
of what is termed the discriminating mind. And yet the mind cannot discri­
minate itself. The mind cannot see the mind itself—just as an eye cannot see 
the eye itself. For the true Mind is that which is entirely indiscriminable, that 
which can never be seen— or rather, is the very substance of activity which 
discriminates, the very substance of activity which sees. Even if called mind, it is 
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Mind which has “no form to be obtained?' Zen endeavors to self-awoken to 
this kind of Mind immediately and directly. In this self-awakening there is 
no need of the mediation of theory and doctrine. This is the reason that Zen 
advocates “directly pointing to man’s Mind?’ However, what is the meaning 
of “directly pointing”? What is the true meaning of “the triple world is a 
deception”? And what relation do they have to Nietzsche’s nihilism?
As we have seen above, the discrimination of the self-mind is an inescapable 
activity arising from the original nature of mind (the discriminating mind); 
and yet, the mind cannot discriminate the mind itself. Therein lies the essential 
dilemma which the mind possesses. The delusion rooted in this essential 
dilemma is generally called avidya (Ignorance) in Buddhism, and is called “non­
awakening” in the Awakening of Faith. That “the triple world is a deception” 
is also not something different from this Ignorance or non-awakening. Ac­
cordingly the realization that “the triple world is a deception” is not some­
thing said merely of the objective world; at the root of this awareness there is 
contained the realization of the delusory and deceptive nature possessed by 
the discriminating mind itself, which sets up that kind of objective world 
and distinguishes between subject and object. Just as the above dilemma is 
something essential to the discriminating mind, the realization that “the 
triple world is a deception,” as well is, with “Ignorance” and “non-awakening,5 
a matter intrinsic to the mind. On this point we find something congruous 
with Nietzsche’s “fundamental falsity.”
Again, Buddhism’s “the triple world is a deception” calls to mind the 
following words of Nietzsche: “that the value of the world lies in our inter­
pretation . . .; that previous interpretations have been perspectival valua­
tions by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, 
for the growth of power .... This idea permeates my writings. The world 
with which we arc concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact.” fW. z. Af., section 
616). The idea of Nietzsche that the value of the world lies in our inter­
pretations, and that there is no world apart from our value-interpretations, is not 
essentially different from Buddhism and the Zen standpoint which hold that 
everything arises from the discriminating mind. For when there is discrimina­
tion, value-interpretation is involved. But in Nietzsche’s case, those value­
interpretations concerning the world, all of which are empty constructs and 
deceptive, had the positive significance of preserving life through a disguised 
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will to power. The world fabricated in terms of value, even though an empty 
construct, was something to be affirmed. For it was also one perspective of 
the will to power. In Buddhism and in Zen, on the contrary, the world 
perceived by the discriminating mind does not possess positive meaning as 
such. It is the world of Ignorance, of deception, which must be absolutely 
negated. The meaning that it is advantageous for the preservation of life is 
not found therein.
Why is this so? In Zen, the delusory nature of the world is not grasped from 
the angle of the will to power, as in Nietzsche’s case; instead it is grasped 
as the issue of illusion or as the issue of non-awakening from the angle of the 
discriminating mind. It is grasped as the problem of how existentially to rid 
oneself of the very dilemma posed by the discriminating mind, “Even to set 
upon the quest for awakening is to go contrariwise.” However, just as the mind 
cannot be objectively grasped, similarly neither illusion nor non-awakening, 
nor “the deception of the triple world” can be objectively realized as such, 
for in that very instance of attempting to treat them objectively as issues 
and conquer them objectively, there is illusion, non-awakening, and “the 
deception of the triple world” in the true sense. Precisely at that time when 
that fact is realized directly in us, do we rid ourselves of illusion and transcend 
non-awakening. But this hardly means to transcend towards an other-shore 
beyond illusion and non-awakening. As expressed in the words “outside of 
mind there is no Dharma, and this mind is precisely Dharma” and “this very 
mind is the Mind of no-mind” (Transmission of Mind), apart from the mind of 
discrimination and delusion there is no true Mind. Apart from the awakening 
of non-awakening, there is no true Awakening. Here is the reason why it is 
said that “when seeing, hearing, perception, and consciousness are simply 
abandoned, the paths of the mind are cut off and there is no place to enter 
Enlightenment; the original Mind is found only in the places of seeing, hearing, 
perceiving, and consciousness” QbitT). For this reason the Zen saying advo­
cates: “Directly pointing to man’s Mind.” The immediacy of mind is no­
mind, is original Mind.
Consequently, even though Nietzsche similarly makes problematic the 
delusory nature of the world and fundamental deception in some sense, in his 
case the will to power is affirmatively posited in their background. In Zen, 
on the contrary, there is nothing at all that can be affirmatively established in 
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their background. That there is nothing at all that can be so posited means 
that outride of tbii mind there is no Dharma, that this mind is originally the 
true Mind, the Mind of no-mind.
However, it is not that Nietzsche’s phrase “fundamental falsity” referred 
merely to the delusory nature of the world; rather it referred to the fabrication 
of God in the depths of the realization of the delusory nature of the world— 
the inevitable functioning of the self-preservation instinct of life. Therein lay 
the reason that Nietzsche proclaims that “God is a sacred lie.” Yet it is 
certain that at the root of that proclamation the will to power was affirmatively 
established. But it must not be overlooked that the core of Nietzsche’s nihi­
lism does not consist in the awareness of the delusory nature of the world; it 
lies in the awareness of the delusory nature of “God” in the sense spoken of 
above. Such Nietzschean themes as antagonism to life, robbing man of natu­
ralness, the fabrication of a world beyond, the active nihilist or Over-man 
who can endure mbilum, were all themes attendant upon his conviction about 
the delusory nature of God. Since our focus of inquiry is Zen and Nietzsche’s 
nihilism, we must further enter into that point.
m
According to Heidegger, the “God” of which Nietzsche speaks is not merely 
the Christian God, but refers also to metaphysical principles from the tradi­
tion of Platonic philosophy on. In other words “God is used as a name for the 
supra-sensory world in general” (Heidegger: Holzwege, p. 199). Nietzsche’s 
attempt at inversion of values was aimed at the overthrow of “God” as supra- 
sensible value common to Christianity and Platonism. This is the reason Nie­
tzsche so bitterly censured Christianity and Platonism. And in the many 
instances where he made these censures, I would like to argue that his imme­
diate and direct enemies were Paul and Kant.
For Nietzsche, the confrontation with Christianity was indeed a theme 
running throughout his career. But the objects of Nietzsche’s severe attacks 
were institutional Christianity and Christian morals, not Jesus Christ himself. 
They were Christian faith, but not Christian practice. Nietzsche writes: “Chris­
tianity as an historical reality must not be confused with that one root that is 
called to mind by this name. The other roots from which historical Christianity 
has grown up have been far more powerful. It is an unexampled misuse of 
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words when such manifestations of decay and abortions as the ‘Christian 
Church,’ ‘Christian faith’ and ‘Christian life5 label themselves with that holy 
name. What did Christ deny? Everything that is today called Christian.” 
f/F. z. M., section 158). Or again: “The word ‘Christianity5 is already a 
misunderstanding—in essence there was only one Christian, and he died on 
the cross. The ‘good tidings’ (Gospel, EvangeliumJ died on the cross. What has 
been called the ‘good tidings’ from that moment was already something con­
trary to what he lived through: an ‘ill tidings,’ a Dysangelium. It is false to the 
point of nonsense to find the mark of the Christian in a ‘faith,’ for example 
in the faith in redemption through Christ. Only Christian practice, only a life 
similar to what he lived who died on the cross is Christian . ..” (Antichrist, 
section 39).
There could be no sharper dichotomy between Christus and Christendom 
than this. For Nietzsche then, who was Jesus Christ, and in what sense did 
Christendom change the Evangelium into a Dysangelium? “He (Jesus) demon­
strates how one must live in order to feel ‘deified5. .. and how one will not 
achieve it through repentance and contrition for one’s sins: ‘Sin is of no 
account5 is his central judgement” (W. %, M., section 160). Jesus did not 
have such concepts as rebellion, revenge, sin, retribution, and judgment. 
“He lived this unity of God and man as his ‘glad tidings5 ” (Antichrist, section 
41). That gospel was pure bliss; it was the freedom, the realization of the 
kingdom of God.
In contrast to this, says Nietzsche, it was Paul who grasped the death of 
Jesus as “God hung on the cross” and as “the sacrifice to redeem man’s sins” 
and who fabricated, not a new practice, but a new faith. “A God who died 
for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection after death—all these are 
counterfeits of true Christianity for which that disastrous wrongheaded 
fellow (Paul) must be held responsible.” (W. z. Af, section 169). It was 
precisely Paul, according to Nietzsche, who brought back the Judaic legal­
istic spirit and ressentiment over which Jesus had conquered, who set up 
the concepts of repayment and retribution in the center of the explanation 
of life, and who established faith in the world beyond and immortality of the 
individual in order to make this world value-less. In place of natural causality, 
he set up a “moral world-order” in which the will of God rules over the 
behavior of man, and thus in place of human sanctification he robbed man 
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of his naturalness. “Paul was the greatest among all the apostles of revenge” 
(Antichrist, section 45).
Nietzsche’s severe censure of Paul was aimed at Paul’s faitb that believed 
in the redemption of sin by Jesus and his resurrection. Moreover it was aimed 
at the point that that faith, based on a rabbinical sentiment, produced Christian 
morality which attempts to rob man of his naturalness, transform aristocratic 
values into lower-class ones, and elevate the inferior and vulgar life. It is 
a well-known fact that Nietzsche severely criticized Christian morality as 
a priestly morality and a slave morality in contrast to an aristocratic morality. 
In Ecce Homo he even writes: “What defines me, what sets me apart from the 
whole rest of humanity is that I exposed Christian morality” (Ecce Homo, 
Kroner edition, p. 406).
Within Jesus’ practice Nietzsche rather saw true life. In contrast to this, 
within Paul’s faith and Christendom after him he found a hostility to life 
rooted in a legalistic spirit, a decadence of life which extols self-abnegation. 
These were the issues concerning Christian morality. “Up to now one has 
always attacked Christianity not only in a modest way but in an erroneous way. 
As long as one has not felt Christian morality as the capital crime against life, 
its defenders have had it all their own way. The question of the mere ‘truth’ 
of Christianity is a matter of secondary importance as long as the value­
question of Christian morality is not touched upon.” (W'. z. M., section 251). 
Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity becomes essentially a criticism of Chris­
tian morality. The questions of the truth of Christianity, of knowledge of God, 
and of faith are also reduced to and treated as the issue of Christian morality. 
This fact was essentially linked with his position of seeing a fundamental 
falsity in the concept of God, and of setting up the will to power in the depths 
of this fundamental falsity.
IV
We have seen above that, for Nietzsche, confrontation with Christianity 
was the greatest task, and that the focal point of his criticism was not Jesus 
but Paul. However, apart from his confrontation with Kant, the rational 
philosopher of the modem world, w’ould not Nietzsche’s nihilism lose its 
sharpness? Is not Nietzsche’s nihilism in a sense a negative inversion of Kant’s 
moral teleology? At any rate, it may be thought to be so in one respect.
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In the very beginning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra there is the well-known 
passage describing the three metamorphoses of the spirit into a camel, a lion, 
and then a child. The camel which hastens over the desert sands as the pious 
spirit bearing a heavy burden becomes a lion as it endeavors to create freedom 
as its own. As the lion itself attempts to become lord of the desert, it clashes 
with a great dragon as his last ruler. “What is the great dragon which the 
spirit no longer calls Lord and God? ‘Thou shalt’ is the name of the great 
dragon. But the spirit of the lion says ‘I will’ ” (Zarathustra, Kroner edition, 
p. 26). The great dragon on whose each and every scale ‘thou shalt5 glitters 
can perhaps be regarded as a symbol of the Judaic-Christian legalism which 
is represented by the Ten Commandments. However, is it not even more 
appropriate to see it as a symbol of Kant’s transcendental ethics, which clari­
fied the ground of possibility of every moral principle since ancient times and 
taught the categorical imperative of the unconditional ‘Thou shalt,5 and as 
a symbol of Kant’s moral and historical teleology, which taught not only 
the postulate of God as the accordance of happiness and virtue but also the 
realization of a moral community as the people of God which pure rational 
faith should set up on earth by transcending the faith of the Churches? For 
Kant’s philosophy was not only a modem reconstruction of Platonism but 
also a product of Protestantism.
That this interpretation of mine is not necessarily inappropriate should be 
clear if considered in conjunction with the fact that even in The Antichrist, 
written as a criticism of Christianity, Nietzsche often speaks of Kant, as for 
example, “How could one fail to feel Kant’s categorical imperative as dangerous 
to life .. . the instinct of theologians alone protected it5’; and “Kant’s success 
is merely a theologian’s success”; and “The instinct which errs without fail, 
anti -nature as instinct, German decadence as philosophy—that is Kant” (Anti­
christ, sections 10, 11). In fact, Nietzsche saw Kant as “in the last analysis, 
a cunning Christian (ein binterlistiger Christ)” (Gotxenddmmerung, Kroner 
edition, p. 99). That words of criticism of Kant appear everywhere in Nie­
tzsche, as for example in the following citations, illustrates the intenseness 
of Nietzsche’s confrontation with Kant. “Kant: or cant would be a more in­
telligible characterization” (ibid., p. 130). “Kant, in his ‘morality’ falsifies his 
interior psychological propensity” (W. %. M., section 424). “Kant as a fanatic 
of the formal concept ‘Thou shalt’ ” (ibid., section 888).
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Nietzsche’s active nihilism arises as a means of destroying Kant’s stifling 
system of moral teleology, which is permeated by that “Thou shalt.” The 
Over-man overturns even Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends, ” which had been 
substituted for the “Kingdom of God.” In Kant, who never ceased teaching 
the primacy of practical reason, both the problem of knowledge and the ques­
tions of religion and history were ultimately reduced to the problem morality. 
They were reduced to the “Thou shalt.” Nietzsche stood diametrically op­
posed to Kant in this matter. And hence it was a natural conclusion for 
Nietzsche, who in reference to Paul censured the Christian morality which 
he thought to be rooted in Paul’s faith, that the greatest “enemy against 
life” to be confronted in the modem world was Kant. With his confrontation 
with Kant Nietzsche’s nihilism became even more scathing. The common el­
ement in Paul and Kant was the legalist spirit which stifles man’s natural 
life. In order to come to the purity of the child who utters the sacred word 
“Yes,” the lion had to bravely challenge the great dragon whose name was 
“Thou shalt.”
V
When Nietzsche said that “God is a sacred lie,” he was astutely counter­
ing the deceptive nature of supra-sensory value which appears in Platonism, 
Paul (Christianity), and Kant, the most modem representative of these two. 
He countered with the claim that such supra-sensory value was a fundamental 
falsity fabricated by life which could not endure nibilum, and hence exposed 
the fact that life and naturalness were robbed by the empty construct of God 
(supra-sensory value). However, when Nietzsche in this way regarded God 
as a deception and said that life is robbed by God, he violently attacked the 
legalist spirit. Accordingly he reduced all problems, that is the problem of 
cognition, reEgion, history, and so forth, to the issue of morality. And this 
reduction, in Nietzsche’s case, is inseparable from the fact that the will to 
power is always placed at the root of the issue. This has been our interpre­
tation of Nietzsche, as articulated above. The issues of priestly morality (slave 
morality) versus aristocratic morality; the one who died on the cross versus 
Dionysius; and his philosophy of the “Over-man” over against the “last man” 
are all developed by taking morality the mode of being of the will, as the pivot.
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Now, what meaning does this standpoint of Nietzsche have when we at­
tempt to consider the question of Zen and nihilism? Nietzsche has censured 
as a fabrication the search for God and the positing of God in the depths of the 
awareness of nibilum. Zen also severely admonishes against seeking for Buddha 
and setting up Buddha.“Do not seek for Buddha outside” is a point which 
Zen always emphasizes, but “outside” hardly means the spatial outside alone. 
Even if one seeks Buddha in the interior of the self, in the depths of an inner 
nibilum, the ‘seeking’ itself already contains the meaning of outside in respect 
to the self itself. Consequently, “do not seek Buddha outside” means do not 
seek Buddha at all, whether inside or outside, for as long as one seeks Buddha, 
the true Buddha cannot self-awaken. This is the reason that Lin-chi says: 
“If you seek a Buddha, you will be seized by a Buddha-devil; if you seek 
a patriarch, you will be bound by a patriarch-devil; if you seek at all, all is 
suffering; it is better that there be no-matter3 ...” It is the reason he says: 
“When the seeking mind ceases, there is no-matter” fLin-chi luf.
3 “No-matter” stands for (J. bttji, C. wu-ihib^ which has no equivalent idea in the 
West. For Zen, Reality is here and now, so it is illusory to search for Reality beyond here 
and now. However, “No-matter” is existentially realized not by withdrawing from but 
by overcoming “searching.” It is the dynamic basis out of which one freely works 
for both oneself and others. Cf. Abe Masao, “Zen and Western Thought,” Inrrrnafiona! 
Pbilotopbical Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 534.
“The seeking mind ceases” does not mean something negative. It means 
the transcendence of self (ecstasis). In true transcendence of self, there is the 
finding of the true Self within an unending expansion of self-awakening: 
there is a realization of true suchness of the world and the self. The 
ecstatic self-awakening in which “the seeking mind ceases,” the endless 
expansion of ecstatic self-awakening which finds the “SelP’ in its midst— 
that is the self-possessed world (the world naturally in its own-being) wherein 
there is no seeking either God or Buddha; it is the world of Reality of the 
phrase: “The blue mountains are of themselves blue mountains, the white 
clouds are of themselves white clouds.” The fact of “no-matter” is also spoken 
of here. What is spoken of in Zen as “your Original Face prior to the birth 
of your father and mother” is nothing other than the infinitely expanded 
ecstatic Self-awakening in which our ordinary7 discriminating awareness itself 
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—the seeking mind— is realized. This is the reason it is also said: “The 
harder you strive after it the further it is away from you. When you no more 
strive after it, lo, it is right in front of you. Its super-sensuous voice fills your 
ear” fLin-chi lu). The relations between the self and others, between the self 
and the world, and even the relation between the self and God arise therein. 
The ecstatic Self-awakening which clearly and endlessly expands in the ten 
directions—without that there is no true Self, no true World.
When Nietzsche rejected God saying that “God is a sacred lie,” God was 
grasped as a supra-sensory value inimical to natural life. Moreover that supra- 
sensory value was not merely something of an ontological character; it was 
something of a legal, moralistic character which attempts to regard what 
extols life as sin and what suppresses life as noble. Wc have already touched 
upon the point that Nietzsche set up the will to power in the depths of the 
concepts of God fabricated as the entity which performs these functions. In 
this case, God is a lie” which makes the self-preservation of life possible
by causing nibilum to attain fullness, on the one hand, and at the same time 
God is a “sacred //<?” produced by the instinct of theologians which brings 
about an inversion of the concepts of “true” and “false.” That it is considered 
as a “fundamental falsity” is also because God himself was one perspective— 
historically, at any rate, efficacious—of the will to power. The perspective 
which was elaborated by the disguised and inverted will to power was God; 
it was the other-shore after life; it was Christian morality based on them. 
Nietzsche’s active nihilism tears off this disguise of the name “God,” and by 
overturning from its foundation the mode of being of the inverting will 
which regards the exfoliation of life as a sin, returns to the will to power itself 
which lies at the deepest root of life. To return to the will to power itself, to 
always stand therein—for Nietzsche, therein was Reality, and the innocence 
of becoming.
Therefore for Nietzsche life, nihilum, God, the innocence of becoming were 
all perspectives of the will to power. The reason for his considering God to be 
“a sacred lie” and for his censure of Paul’s faith as giving a ground to a priestly 
morality is that despite the fact that they were perspectives—seemingly 
efficacious for life—of the will to power, Nietzsche saw them as ultimately 
self-deceptive enterprises of the will to power functioning hostilely against 
life. That cognition, religion, and history were grasped in essence as questions 
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of morality was also based on their all being grasped as perspectives of the will 
to power.
VI
Now, from the perspective of religion, and especially of Zen, at least the 
following two questions must be asked of this standpoint of Nietzsche.
Firstly, when Nietzsche speaks of God and faith, how is the problem of death 
grasped therein? Nietzsche writes in the following way in the chapter entitled 
“On Free Death” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “Die at the right time: so teacheth 
Zarathustra.” For Nietzsche, the ideal death is precisely death not too late, 
not too early, “the free death which cometh unto me because I want it.” In the 
same chapter he also writes: “The consummating death I show unto you, 
which bccometh a stimulus and promise to the living.” How, then, did 
Nietzsche view the death of Jesus? “Verily, that Hebrew [Jesus] died too early 
whom the preachers of slow death4 honor: and to many hath it proved a cal­
amity that he died too early” (Zarathustra, p. 78). We have seen above that 
Nietzsche found what is truly Christian not in the faith of Paul but within 
the practice of Jesus. That practice was one of compassion (Mitleiden) and 
love which, not being hostile even to those who do one violence, prays toge­
ther with them, suffers with them, loves them. “This ‘bringer of glad tidings’ 
died as he had lived, as he had taught—not to ‘redeem men’ but to show how 
one must live. Precisely this practice is his legacy to mankind” (Antichrist, 
section 35).
4 Christian clergymen who teach the necessity of enduring suffering.
If I may say so, for Nietzsche, death was the consummation of life. Jesus 
exhibited the evangelical practice of compassion and love, but since he died 
too early he ended without knowing how to love the great earth and life. 
Nietzsche interprets this fact as causing Paul and the apostles of the early 
church to raise the questions “who killed him, who is his real enemy?” to 
bring about the faith in his sacrificial death for the sake of the redemption of 
sin and in his resurrection, and to produce the decadence of life, a morality of 
ressentiment. Here we see the forms of Nietzsche, the philosopher of life who 
views death from the side of life alone, and of Nietzsche, the anti-moralist (who 
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grasps morality as the greatest problem), who grasps even faith exclusively as 
a morality which causes a degeneration of life.
However, is death in fact something exhausted in the consummation of life? 
Can the true nature of death be grasped by seeing death from the side of life 
alone? Do not Paul’s words “I die day by day” (i Corinthians 15-31) on the 
contrary express the true nature of death, and accordingly the true meaning 
of life? Zen, which self-awakens to the birth-and-death of the moment and 
grasps birth-and-death itself as the Great Death, on this point differs from 
Nietzsche and rather is in agreement with Paul. An existential self-realization 
of death is essential to a great affirmation of life. From this standpoint the fact 
that Nietzsche focused his attention only upon the legalistic spirit within the 
Pauline faith and censured faith exclusively from the angle of morality as 
something which produces a priestly morality that causes a suppression and 
degeneration of life, must be said to miss the true meaning of faith, and in 
turn, of religion. This fact causes us to recall that Kant’s understanding of 
religion which while taking radical evil as its theme, ultimately did not touch 
the core of religion and was based on his attempt to grasp religion from the 
standpoint of practical reason, morality. To Paul, faith did not suppress life; 
it was the living of a new life which is supported by the realization of death. 
As he said,“—always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life 
of Jesus may also be manifested in our bodies” (2 Corinthians 4-10) and “I 
have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who 
lives in me; and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God” 
(Galatians 2-20). Paul died and rose again with Christ. In that case, needless 
to say, Christ’s death and resurrection was for Paul a spiritual fact which 
made his own resurrection through death possible. It was not something 
merely fabricated in the depths of nibilum, rather a living Reality in which 
spiritual life became real and present in him. Paul’s is a standpoint of the self­
realization of ontological life which ultimately cannot be reduced to the issue 
of morality. On this point, Zen, which realizes birth-and-death itself as the 
Great Death and gains a new Life of rebirth through the realization of the 
Great Death, does not differ from the standpoint of Paul in essence.
Having taken up the theme of awareness of death in Nietzsche and having 
stated that the core of religion cannot be touched as long as religion is grasped 
by reducing it to the problem of morality, as in Nietzsche, we must inquire 
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secondly whether Nietzsche’s standpoint of the will to power truly expresses 
the innocence of becoming.
As repeatedly said above, when Nietzsche regarded God as a sacred lie, 
Nietzsche himself recognized the fact that in one aspect it was an enterprise 
inescapable from the instinct of self-preservation of life which cannot endure 
nibilum. In other words, for Nietzsche God too was one perspective of the will 
to power. But God was rejected as an empty construct because it was a self- 
deceptive function of a disguised and inverted will to power. Nietzsche 
proclaimed the arrival of nihilism and emphasized that one had to live as an 
active nihilist, i.e. Over-man, who can endure nibilum without a God. This 
was because however much it was for the sake of preservation of life, he 
rejected that kind of self-deception and lived with utter sincerity by returning 
to, and taking his stand in, the fundamental will to power itself. For Nietzsche 
it was precisely therein that the innocence of becoming became present and 
true naturalness shone forth. Nevertheless, was Nietzsche’s standpoint of the 
will to power one in which the innocence of becoming and true naturalness 
really present themselves? Rephrased from the perspective of Zen, the 
question would seem to be best put as follows: Is Nietzsche’s standpoint 
of the will to power in fact “the place where the seeking mind ceases”? Is 
it truly “no-matter” in the sense above mentioned (p. 25)? This rephrasing 
is necessary because in Zen the innocence of becoming and true naturalness 
is realized only in “the place where the seeking mind ceases” and in “no­
matter.”
Nietzsche’s will to power may perhaps be said to express the innocence 
of becoming as a cosmological will which regards even God as a perspective 
of itself and which also restores the naturalness which has been robbed in the 
name of God. And yet, when seen from a Zen perspective, even if it is cos­
mological and not at all of the character of a personal God, is not the will to 
power still the “seeking mind”? However deeply the will to power is realized 
as such it is “something” affirmatively posited in the background of God as 
“a sacred lie,” but not “Nothingness.” It is a “matter,” not “no-matter.” As 
has been stated above (p. 17 fF.) Zen, like Nietzsche, emphasizes the delu­
sory nature of the world and severely admonishes against seeking for Buddha 
and setting up Buddha. Unlike Nietzsche, however, Zen does not affirmatively 
establish anything in the background of either the world or Buddha------ 
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Zen establishes ‘nothing’ in their background. Hence Zen’s realization that 
outside of this mind there is no Dharma: this mind is originally the true 
Mind. In this Zen realization the “seeking mind” completely ceases and 
“no-matter” is realized. The innocence of becoming is also truly realized 
herein. And directness in pointing to man’s Mind and Self-awakening to the 
true Mind is possible only through the realization of “nothingness” behind 
God and the world, i.e., the realization of complete non-objectification. On 
the contrary Nietzsche posits the will to power as the basic principle behind 
God and the world. However basic it may be, the will to power is not 
“Nothingness” but “something” affirmatively established and thereby not 
free from objectification. This is the reason I said the will to power is still the 
“seeking mind.” Indeed, is it not the most fundamental form of the “seeking 
mind” itself? In that limitation, it cannot be called the standpoint of“having 
no-matter; that is the noble man.” (Lin-cbi lu)
The Zen standpoint of “the place where the seeking mind ceases is precisely 
no-matter,” as touched on above, is the standpoint of a thoroughgoing ecstatic 
Self-awakening. In self-transcendence(ecstasis^ a “naturalness” or “being so of 
itself” fjinen §**), in which everything personal, including a personal God, 
is transcended, presents itself. It is “the originally pure,” and “no-matter.” 
And yet as ecstatic Self-awakening it is existential through and through. What 
Lin-chi calls the “True Man of no rank” also points to “the Man of no-matter,” 
“the originally pure Man,” as the manifestation of a “naturalness” which thus 
transcends everything of a personal character.
In that limitation, this kind of standpoint of Zen has something in common 
with the standpoint of Nietzsche rather than of Paul. For Paul’s standpoint, 
though congruous with Zen as stated above in the sense of the presence of 
a new life through the mediation of the awareness of death, is to the end 
personal and not transpersonal in its basic structure. The standpoint of Zen, 
on the contrary, together with that of Nietzsche, is cosmological, yet at the 
same time existential. Therein lay the reason that Nietzsche’s standpoint 
of the will to power restores the naturalness “robbed” by the personal God 
and causes the innocence of becoming to appear. However that naturalness, 
that innocence of becoming was not something mediated by a thoroughgoing 
awareness of death. This means nothing other than that Nietzsche’s inno­
cence of becoming was based on the standpoint of the will to power.
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Nietzsche negated and rejected God as a “sacred lie” and was permeated 
by an awareness of profound deception and nihtlum. But his standpoint which 
grasps everything in the perspective of the will to power, and consequently 
which, without the mediation of a thorough awareness of death, considers the 
problematic of religion from the angle of morality, can still not, when seen 
from Zen, be squared with “the place where the seeking mind ceases is pre­
cisely no-matter.” The standpoint of the Over-man must still be said to be far 
from the standpoint of “the True Man of no rank.” For the “innocence of 
becoming” to truly present itself, the Over-man must become the Trr# Man.
Postscript
There still remain some important questions here. For example, how can 
one progress from the standpoint of the Over-man to the standpoint of the 
True Man? And what of the existential, practical questions contained there­
in? Precisely these were the most important existential questions of overcom­
ing Nietzschean nihilism. If I may be permitted to add one word in postscript 
concerning these important topics, which should be discussed but have been 
left out, I would suggest the following.
As stated above, Nietzsche’s standpoint of the will to power does not 
transcend the “seeking mind” itself even though it is the source of the “seeking 
mind.” This signifies that Nietzsche’s “innocence of becoming” was still not 
“unblemished” and “pure.” Accordingly, Nietzsche’s own “will to power,” 
which he considered had transcended every empty construct and deception, 
was itself, on a deeper level, an empty construct and a deception. These facts must 
be clearly realized. This awareness, that the “will to power” itself is an 
empty construct and a deception is not, therefore, a Nietzschean nihilism at 
all That is, it is not a nihilism which I referred to above as “nihilism based on 
an awareness of falsity.” As a nihilism which negates even the will to power 
itself as a deception, it may perhaps be called a nihilism as an awareness of the 
devil.
The nihilism which Dostoievski made problematic is rather of the latter 
type. The devil is the embodiment of the Nietzschean awareness of falsity. (Cf. 
my paper “Falsity and the Devil,” Riso no. 355.) Lin-chi emphasized that to 
reach an authentic and genuine understanding of Buddhism, there must be a 
discerning eye of the Dharma for discriminating Buddhas from devils and taught 
31
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
that “both the Buddhas and the devils must be struck down.” As long as Zen 
and Nietzsche is our theme, the disclosure of a way from the Over-man to 
the True Man is a necessary topic, and again, for that, the clarification of 
nihilism as an awareness of the devil and the elucidation of a way to over­
come it is an inescapable theme. However, in this small essay, I could not go 
into that question.
Translated by David Dilworth
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